CAF Doctrine 3 - Study

Dent 2025.

Series

Brendan McBreen Three Hundred Assaults

Substack series

Insights extract

a. Find the enemy first
b. Shoot first and shoot the most
c. Read the dirt
d. Advance using fire and movement
e. Avoid enemy machine guns

Also worth reading from McBreen:

https://2ndbn5thmar.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Suppression-Critical-McBreen-230918.pdf

Army.ca thread on section attack

Thinking about the Infantry Attack

Evaluating a Section Attack

https://army.ca/forums/threads/thinking-about-the-infantry-attack.18270/post-1878617

How would I go about evaluating a Section Attack with metrics? First, we
evaluate it through OPFOR enabled force on force NOT live fire. Second, my
though is we first break it down by using the Canadian Army’s war fighting
functions as our base. Some items would be enabled by CUBIC WES and would be
hard numbers, other items would be based on hard yes or no questions derived
from our doctrinal processes. How effective each item under a yes or no answer
would be subjective and therefore why it would be hard to measure other than a
simple yes or no.

Command

Time from 1st Contact until enemy position engaged with effective fire
Time from 1st Contact until full contact report sent to higher
Was a GRIT issued?
Was an H hour set?
Were control measures issued?
Where there any blue on blue casualties? (Speaks to both control measures and
blue SA by soldiers and leaders)

Sense

Who saw who first? (Speaks to balancing speed vs security in advance, section
movement formations etc.)
What did blue forces think they were engaging vs what the enemy strength actually
was?

Act

Hit % by weapon system during three phases: Initial contact, direct fire plan
by fire base, assault force engagement after the ceasing of fire base support
Did the fire base meet the direct fire plan timings?
(Speaks to both time and space considerations as well as ammo consumption rates)
Total enemy rounds fired by OPFOR during blue force direct fire plan
(Speaks to effectiveness of suppression)
% of time moving force were not under cover from enemy observation and fires.
Broken out for both Fire base and assault forces

Shield

What % of the Section is KIA at consolidation
(speaks to use of ground and fire positions etc.)
What % of the Section is WIA at consolidation
(speaks to use of ground and fire positions etc.)
Overall enemy % for the number of rounds OPFOR fired vs Bluefor casualties
% of Section ammo left upon consolidation
Were soldiers sited and given defensive ARCs upon culmination of the attack?

Sustain

Time from soldier receiving wounds to buddy aid being applied?
Were key weapons systems and/or ammo redistributed from KIA/WIA upon consolidation

The Infantry Section and Platoon in Battle (1996)

This one is available publicly:
B-GL-309-003/FT-001, The Infantry Section and Platoon in Battle (1996).

Canadian Army - Infantry Section and Platoon in Battle

The updated version from 2009 is not available.

B-GL-309-003/FT-00, Section and Platoon in Battle (Draft 2009).

arma3_tactical_guide.pdf

Included in the bonus content folder of the Arma 3 install. Written by Dyslexi, a very insightful guide to all things Arma 3, including Leadership and fire fights.

primaryandsecondary.com

Control the Hall Control the Floor

Research - youtube

Research - other

Canada

Anecdotes, quips, sayings, rules of thumb

Find, Fix, Flank and Finish
Find, Fix, Finish, Follow-Through
Half of tactics is dirt

Three Hundred Assaults, Brendan McBreen
Fire without maneuver is indecisive, Maneuver without fire is Fatal

USMC
The most important six inches on the battlefield is between your ears

General James Mattis USMC
An officer can't look scared or tense; it's contagious

Captain Blackstone, Starship Troopers (Book, Chapter 13)
Breaking off combat is most easily accomplished after a successful offensive
maneuver

Rommel, Attacks, page 72
Create dilemmas, not problems

General James Mattis USMC

Authors

Consultant A. Dent